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By David Beaumont This article, and the series which follows, are an updated version of a presentation given at the Australian National University titled ‘ Logistics preparedness and mobilising the national support base: the effectiveness of ADF strategic logistics prior to Operation Warden 1999 ‘. P art One , Two and Three can be found here.
By David Beaumont This article, and the series which follows, are an updated version of a presentation given at the Australian National University titled ‘ Logistics preparedness and mobilising the national support base: the effectiveness of ADF strategic logistics prior to Operation Warden 1999 ‘.
The result is a growing military logistics experience gap, presenting readiness challenges for future battlefields on which contract support may not be a viable option. In 2001, under LOGCAP III, support returned to KBR which supported expanding operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, Jordan, Kenya, Uzbekistan and Georgia.
Defence presently engages with industry through a multiple of channels, with key agents being the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), Joint Logistics Command (JLC) and a variety of other groups, units, functions, including the Services, responsible for their own component of the logistics process.
Defence presently engages with industry through a multiple of channels, with key agents being the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), Joint Logistics Command (JLC) and a variety of other groups, units, functions, including the Services, responsible for their own component of the logistics process.
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